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Taking the right to exit seriously
b e n  s p i e c ke r , doret  de  ruyte r  
and  jan  ste ute l
Department of Philosophy and History of Education,Vrije University Amsterdam,
The Netherlands
ab st rac t
Both diversity and autonomy liberals agree that adults have the right to exit 
from voluntary associations. As children do not have this right, the paradoxical
character of the upbringing of children in fundamentalist and ultra-orthodox
communities is evident. Diversity liberals like Galston and Spinner-Halev seem 
to take an ambivalent position with regard to the right to exit, because they want
to defend both the child’s future right to exit, which requires particular capacities,
as well as the parental right to upbringing according to their conception of the
good even if this undermines the required capacities.
We defend that people need to be at least autarchic, that is self-determining and
morally accountable, in order to be able to exercise their right to exit. Since this
right is a civic freedom right, the state has the right and duty to ensure that children
will be able to develop into autarchic persons.Therefore, our claim is that school
education should aim for minimal autonomy and that such education should be
compulsory.We argue that this will not undermine legitimate diversity and there-
fore that Galston and Spinner-Halev should be able to take an unequivocal position.
keyword s autarchy, autonomy, children’s rights, diversity liberalism, parental
rights, right to exit
i nt roduc t i on
R e p re se ntat ive s  of  both political and diversity liberalism claim that
the state must grant religious communities and groups the right to enable their
members to maintain their religious identity and to establish the same identity
in their offspring. Parents have the right to initiate their children into their
religious beliefs and practices as well as the right to found denominational
[ 3 1 3 ]
Theory and Research in Education
Copyright © 2006, sage publications , www.sagepublications.com
vol 4 (3 ) 313–327 ISSN 1477-8785 DOI: 10.1177/1477878506069102
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on October 25, 2012tre.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
schools for them. According to autonomy liberalism, however, these rights
should never impede or interfere with the right of children to develop into
autonomous persons later in life. Consequently, in this view the state should
see to it that in upbringing and schooling parents and teachers do not infringe
this fundamental right.
Surely, liberals from all strands agree that adults from ultra-orthodox and
fundamentalist communities can decide for themselves to live their lives in a
non-autonomous way and to subject themselves freely to rules that curtail
almost every aspect of their doings. Minors are not given this particular right,
because they have not yet reached the years of discretion. The paradoxical
character of the upbringing of children in such communities will then be
evident: as children they do not have the right to make such far-reaching
decisions, but they may never be able to make them when they are entitled
to, because they are subjected to the legal authority of their ultra-orthodox
and fundamentalist parents, who have an interest in not promoting the
development of those capacities that enable them to make autonomous
decisions in due time. More strongly, these parents will often actively hamper
the development of those critical capacities that might enable the child to
revise or reject their religious beliefs and practices. Autonomy liberals (e.g.
Levinson, 1999) therefore argue that public schools have the explicit mission
to overcome and compensate the failings of the mentioned religious upbring-
ing and to strongly pursue the development of the student’s critical capacities.
Others, especially diversity liberals like Galston and Spinner-Halev, deal in our
view sometimes rather half-heartedly or ambivalently with the inherent
paradox of ultra-orthodox upbringing. For them it is of the utmost import-
ance that adult members of religious communities have the right to exit and
they acknowledge that exerting this right requires that adults have acquired
certain mental dispositions, which in turn requires a particular kind of
education. Nevertheless, this right, in our view, is conceived almost as a ‘token’
or ‘alibi’ right, because, as we will argue, it is based on too thin a conception
of our (including the child’s) psychological dispositions and their development
and education.While the right to exit is a negative right, i.e. a right that corre-
sponds with a duty of others not to prevent one from doing ‘x’, and not a
right to receive or be assisted to do ‘x’, the negative right of adults implies that
they should not be hindered in the development of their ability to exercise
whatever the right allows them to. Moreover, according to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, children are entitled to education that is directed
to ‘the development of the child’s personality, talents and mental and physical
abilities to their fullest potential’. This means, of course, that the right to
develop or receive education towards exercising negative rights, in this case
the right to exit, is a positive right.After having explicated rather extensively
Theory and Research in Education 4 (3 )
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how particularly Galston and Spinner-Halev conceive of the right of exit, we
will argue that being able to exercise this right presupposes a minimal but
substantive conception of education and development.
th e  r i g h t  to  e x i t  and  le g i t i mate  d ive r s i ty
Citizens, according to Rawls, have the moral power to form, revise and pursue
a conception of the good, and therefore adults within traditional or ultra-
orthodox religious communities or sects have the right to reject or revise their
inherited religious beliefs and practices.According to his political conception
of liberalism, members of these communities are not required to give up or
revise their illiberal constitutive ends in private life.They may simply regard
it as unthinkable to view themselves apart from their inherited religious
beliefs. Rawls acknowledges that a problem arises about the children who are
educated in these groups (Rawls, 1993: 199). His political liberalism requires
that children’s education include such issues as knowledge of their constitu-
tional and civic rights, so that they know that apostasy or exercising the right
to exit is not a legal crime. To this Rawls adds: ‘Moreover, their education
should also prepare them to be fully cooperating members of society and
enable them to be self-supporting; it should also encourage the political virtues
so that they want to honour the fair terms of social cooperation in their
relation with the rest of society’ (Rawls, 1993: 199). Gutmann (1995) and Callan
(1997) also claim that stressing the necessity of the promotion of civic virtues
actually comes down to educating children according to a comprehensive
liberal conception.While we will show that their position is not quite correct,
we do agree with Snik who states that the right to exit not only conflicts with
the central beliefs of the illiberal communities, but that it requires educational
practices which are at right angles to the illiberal ones (Snik, 1999: 144).
Diversity liberalism is, roughly stated, focused on the protection of legitimate
diversity. Diversity liberals argue that to place the ideal of autonomy at the core
of liberalism is in fact to eliminate diversity. Legitimate diversity, however, does
not imply that the liberal state is comprehensively neutral; this state is charac-
terized by pursuit of a distinctive ensemble of liberal purposes, which, accord-
ing to Galston, warrant public interference with group practices. He argues, for
instance, that in the diversity model of free association, groups may be illiberal
in their internal structure and practices but that this is only justified as long as
the liberal purposes of freedom of entrance and exit are zealously safeguarded
by the state (Galston, 1995: 533; 2002: 23). Other examples of these purposes are
the protection of human life and the protection and promotion of normal
development of basic capacities: the ‘latter would allow the state to intervene
against communities that bind infants’ skulls or malnourish them in ways that
Spiecker, De Ruyter and Steutel:Taking the right to exit seriously
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impede physical growth and maturation’ (Galston, 2002: 23). It is striking that
Galston offers an example in which ‘basic capacities’ are narrowed down to
physical capacities. However, Galston explicitly states that the right to exit
should be more than formal, implying that communities should not ‘disem-
power individuals – intellectually, emotionally, or practically – from living
successfully outside their bounds’ (2002: 104).The exit right is a right of adults;
for a child to be able to exercise this right in the future requires that she acquire
the mentioned basic capacities; consequently, communities should empower
children ‘intellectually, emotionally, or practically’. After all, ‘we are born into
certain groups to which we do not choose to belong’ and consequently the
child’s position does not fit into the classical model of voluntary associations
(Galston, 1995: 533). For the exit right to be a meaningful right, Galston
mentions four conditions, from which, in our view, the necessary elements of
an upbringing and education that prepare the child for exercising this right can
be extrapolated. These elements are: ‘knowledge conditions – the awareness of
alternatives to the life one is in fact living; capacity conditions – the ability to assess
these alternatives if it comes to seem desirable to do so; psychological conditions –
in particular, freedom from the kinds of brainwashing and more broadly, forms
of coercion other than the purely physical that give rise to warranted state inter-
ference on behalf of the affected individuals; fitness conditions – the ability of the
individual to participate effectively in at least some ways of life other than the
one she wishes to leave’ (Galston, 1995: 553–4, our italics). These conditions
evidently overlap and are interrelated; therefore, in briefly analysing some of the
educational implications of the conditions, particularly of the intellectual and
emotional dispositions, we will not comment on them separately. These
conditions prohibit parents and teachers from withholding or conceal from
children knowledge or awareness of other legitimate ways of life or concep-
tions of the good. Although parents and teachers alike have the right to assess
and evaluate from their own religious perspectives these other ways of life and
religions in no uncertain terms, their representation of these alternatives never-
theless must meet the knowledge condition.This condition also implies that the
child’s cognitive development should not be hampered by isolating the child in
its own closed family circle or by preventing the child from acquiring the infor-
mation that is needed for appraising her beliefs.The child can only assess the
alternatives if she is not hindered or incapacitated by an overload of feelings of
irrational fear, shame and guilt; neither should her capacities to do so be stunted
by the mind-programming efforts of her educators, who for example might
have inculcated her with thought-terminating clichés or interpretative short-
cuts, like ‘god or devil terms’ (Spiecker, 1991).With regard to adults, according
to Galston, the third condition allows for state intervention in case of certain
forms of coercion other than the purely physical; the same intervention seems
Theory and Research in Education 4 (3 )
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to be justified when minors are subjected to forms of coercion, like denying
children to go to school, which might prevent them from meeting the
mentioned conditions and therefore possibly from exercising the right to exit
later in life. Galston indeed agrees with Callan (1997) that parental actions
fostering ethical servility, i.e. ‘an ignorant apathy towards all alternatives to the
ethical ideal I [a parent] inculcated during childhood’ (Callan, 1997: 153), in
children amount to illegitimate despotism (Galston, 2002: 105).
Can we then conclude that the conditions for making the right to exit a
meaningful one not only help us to identify which forms of traditionalist or
fundamentalist education are expressions of illegitimate despotism but also
narrow down the scope of what can be conceived as legitimate diversity? Here
Galston warns us to be cautious, for practical educational issues cannot be
resolved on the plane of moral abstractions only. Parental decisions must be
evaluated within the full context of influences, which also shape the child’s
development: ‘And it is not enough to judge the intention of parents’
educational decisions; we must also look at their concrete results’ (Galston,
2002: 106). However, here the ‘intention–success’ distinction in our view is
used rather unjustly;whether parental despotism is or is not illegitimate cannot
be decided on the basis of the outcome of the child’s development.A sexually
or mentally abused child can still grow into a well-adjusted adult because of
her genetic make-up and innumerable environmental influences, but that fact
is hardly of any importance in assessing the immoral nature of the abuses.And
the argument that there are youngsters from ultra-orthodox families who,
despite the pressures of their parents and the community, manage to live
successfully as law-abiding and responsible citizens in the outside world, does
not justify suppressive educational intentions and practices because it is not
known in general how many youngsters were successfully disempowered (the
so-called ‘false negatives’ in empirical research). Thus, despite Galston’s
warning, we believe that the question should be answered affirmatively: taking
both legitimate diversity and the right to exit seriously presupposes, as we will
explain later, a somewhat robust conception of upbringing and schooling, one
that at the least aims for minimal autonomy (or autarchy). It should be noted
that taking the latter aim seriously still offers parents and educators a vast array
of possibilities of initiating their children into a religious tradition.Vojak and
Feinberg raise the same issue by posing the question which degree of
autonomy Galston exactly considers necessary for exit-ability:‘This may prove
to be a complicated question, for it is the most vulnerable and disempowered
members of society (women, children, and minorities) who most fear the
repercussions of exiting, and will most likely be held hostage under a plural
value system that grants broad discretion to groups that wish to limit choice’
(Vojak and Feinberg, 2004: 191).
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Galston, so we conclude, adopts a rather ambivalent position regarding the
right to exit; his probing analyses of how to make the right a meaningful one
somehow do not fully affect or permeate his mission to take legitimate diver-
sity seriously. Spinner-Halev, as we will demonstrate next, takes a half-hearted
position regarding the right to exit. Later, we will suggest that the rather
inconsistent views of both philosophers regarding this right may be partly
elucidated by referring to the principled differences in liberal democracies
between the legitimate aims of (orthodox) parental upbringing on the one
hand and those of civic education in schools on the other.
Ultra-orthodox religious communities, or insular communities as Spinner-
Halev calls them,need internal and external restrictions to retain their identity.
However, not every restriction is acceptable in a liberal democratic state and
therefore what is needed is a principle of non-intervention, which spells out
the conditions that a community must meet in order to prevent intervention
by the state into its practices. Following Raz’s conditions of autonomy,
Spinner-Halev sums up the following conditions: (1) people must be given a
minimal education so that they can consider their options and function
outside their community (the condition of appropriate mental abilities);
(2) members should not be completely shielded from the larger society 
(the condition of having an adequate range of options from which to choose);
(3) no one in the community should be coerced (condition of independence).
‘In sum, there must be a real right to exit’ (Spinner-Halev, 2000: 71). However,
Spinner-Halev posits, the conditions needed to ensure this right are more
minimal than many liberals think (2000: 57). We disagree with him on this
evaluation. In our view, the first two conditions of non-intervention, in order
to make sense, must also regard the educational intentions or efforts of parents
and teachers; after all, people do not acquire these dispositions by virtue of
their natural ability only. How seriously does Spinner-Halev take the right to
exit? How consistent is he in assessing educational practices with the help of
the conditions, which he explicitly subscribes? On the one hand, he argues
that each community should educate their members in order for them to have
the appropriate mental abilities and not coerce them. Members should not be
denied basic education, because they should have a choice about their lives
(2000: 47, 51, 54). This means that they should be taught reading and rudi-
mentary knowledge in maths and science (2000: 79). On the other hand, he
constricts the content of the mentioned conditions and educational intentions
in a rather inadmissible way. First, ‘appropriate mental abilities’ are restricted
to ‘knowing that’; members of insular communities should know that they can
exercise the right to exit (2000: 72). However, knowledge is only a necessary
condition for a person to be able to exercise her right to exit. She also needs
to acquire the so-called intellectual virtues and cognitive emotions and it
Theory and Research in Education 4 (3 )
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seems unlikely that these are stimulated in children in repressive or authori-
tarian education. Spinner-Halev understands that many children have diffi-
culty straying from the paths of their parents: ‘This can often be
psychologically difficult. So what?’ (2000: 75). To answer this rhetorical
question: it all depends on the kind and level of pressure the children are
subjected to. Severe emotional pressure or psychological coercion that will
seriously hamper the development of the mentioned appropriate mental
dispositions is in our view unacceptable and therefore does matter. Spinner-
Halev seems to take a different view; he conceives coercion in upbringing
almost exclusively in terms of physical coercion or harm (2000: 76, 79). Some
Orthodox Jewish parents, so we are informed, have said the prayer for the dead
when their child has married a non-Jew and this makes ‘the choice of
marrying a non-Jew rather daunting’ (2000: 76). Spinner-Halev thinks this
threat of being considered dead to be permissible in a liberal regime, and –
though indeed pedagogically questionable – we agree with him, be it that in
order to take the right to exit seriously the young adult must have had the
opportunity to acquire the necessary mental dispositions to face this daunting
choice. As these parents most probably will also raise their children in a
strongly sheltered manner, for instance by strong censorship with regard to
public information and condoning friendships within the community only
(Ammerman, 1988), thereby intentionally discouraging the development of
the relevant cognitive, emotional and volitional dispositions, Spinner-Halev’s
third condition probably will not be met and the right to exit then remains
a purely formal one.The same therefore is true for the acclaimed choice that
members of insular communities have about their lives. If this is interpreted
as a substantial choice to stay within or leave one’s religious community, this
implies at least a minimal understanding of the pros and cons of this decision,
including what it means to live in a liberal democracy, and the capacity to
weigh one’s personal beliefs and preferences. If the right to exit and having a
choice about their lives are perceived as predominantly formal issues, the indi-
vidual’s right of freedom of conscience is subordinated to the group’s right to
uphold a religious doctrine (Kymlicka, 2002: 239) and the right of insular
communities to survive takes precedence over the right of children to have a
decent and basic upbringing and education; often the aim of education cannot
be but ethical servility. In our view, Spinner-Halev’s arguments for surviving
diversity indeed imply that he takes a half-hearted position regarding the right
to exit.To establish the legitimacy of diversity a consistent conception of the
right to exit must be used.
So far we have referred to the mental abilities that enable a person to
exercise the right to exit in a rather formal manner, in terms of relevant
cognitive, affective and volitional capacities. In order to better understand
Spiecker, De Ruyter and Steutel:Taking the right to exit seriously
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what these capacities might involve and how the child might acquire these
dispositions we have to call upon the theories and research of developmental
and moral psychologists. In the next section we will briefly draw upon both
Kohlberg’s structural developmental theory and Nucci’s domain theory of
moral development.
a  l i t t le  th e ory  and  re searc h  about  moral
deve lop m e nt
Exercising the right to exit and making a choice how to arrange one’s life also
requires a certain level of moral reasoning; it is part of Rawls’ second moral
power, the so-called capacity for a conception of the good. Moral issues like
loyalty to family members, personal integrity, feelings of shame and guilt, and
the well-being of group members often deeply influence the mentioned
mental abilities. Can we be more specific about this level? According to
Kohlberg, moral development comprises three levels (pre-conventional,
conventional and post-conventional) or six stages of moral reasoning and
judgment; the core of each stage is an underlying conception of justice and
each higher stage is more suitable for resolving justice problems (1981). For
our inquiry stage 3 and 4 of the conventional level are of interest.The first,
the interpersonal concordance or ‘Good Boy–Nice Girl’ orientation, refers to
good behaviour: behaviour which pleases or helps others and which is
approved by them. There is conformity to stereotypical images of what is
majority behaviour (Kohlberg, 1981: 18). Stage 4 is described by Kohlberg as
‘Society Maintaining Orientation’, as an orientation towards legal authority, fixed
rules and the maintenance of social order. The post-conventional level of
moral reasoning is characterized by the effort to define the validity and appli-
cation of moral values and principles apart from the authority of groups or
persons holding these principles and apart from the individual’s own identifi-
cation with these groups (1981: 18).Although we acknowledge that there have
been a lot of valid critical comments and complements on Kohlberg’s theory
and research, we think it justifiable to use his characterization of conventional
moral reasoning or judgment as a heuristic device. It seems doubtful that a
person who functions on stage 3 of this conventional level has the relevant
cognitive – and the corresponding affective – moral capacities for making the
right to exit a meaningful one. Staying within one’s closed religious
community predominantly because of painful feelings of guilt and shame
regarding one’s parents hardly qualifies as an adequate justification for such an
incisive choice. Moreover, apostasy will perhaps be understood as a crime or
a trespass of other fixed rules. Choices regarding religious beliefs and practices
somehow seem to imply a personal decision, a weighing of reasons from a
Theory and Research in Education 4 (3 )
[ 3 2 0 ]
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on October 25, 2012tre.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
more or less personal perspective. A person can personally commit herself to
an authority, be it a holy text or sacred person, or to social rules that are meant
to maintain a prevailing social order; this person’s justifying moral reasons are
characteristic of stage 4. In our view, this stage of moral reasoning will
sufficiently enable a person to exercise the right to exit.This person governs
herself by attuning her behaviour to self-accepted moral rules and this implies
that in principle she can change her mind. Such an agent,who has the capacity
to order her life according to a nomos, is called an autarchic person by Benn
(1988). Though the autarchic person has not reached (Kohlberg’s) post-
conventional, autonomous or principled level of moral reasoning, she is
morally self-governing and consequently morally accountable for, among
innumerable other things, whether or not she exercises the right to exit.The
essential difference between autarchy (Kohlberg’s stage 4) and autonomy (stage
5) is located in the ability and tendency to reflect critically on the validity of
moral rules (Steutel, 1991: 66). The autarchic person is convinced that her
moral rules are valid and justified but she is not necessarily disposed and able
to give a rational justification for these rules; for her the fact that a moral rule
is part of a tradition can in itself be a good reason for complying with it.
According to us, being both morally self-governing and accountable at the
conventional, stage 4, level of moral reasoning is a necessary condition for
exercising the right to exit, and in doing so a person at this stage of moral
development demonstrates autarchic freedom as minimal autonomy (Steutel,
1991: 68).
Having stated that exercising the right to exit involves making personal
choices with regard to religious beliefs and practices, we should also ask what
is meant by personal development or, as Nucci would say, development within
the personal domain. Nucci (2001) distinguishes between three logically
distinct domains, which from a psychological perspective influence each other
mutually: the conventional, the moral and the personal domain.The personal
refers to a set of actions that define the boundaries of individual authority and
behavioral discretion, and gives the individual a sense of ‘agency instead of
being a martinet scripted by socially inherited roles and contexts’ (Nucci,
2001: 54).The child establishes the personal borders in dialogue with others,
with social and cultural norms.The content of the personal domain is, Nucci
emphasizes, the content of the individual’s identified freedoms and the latter
is a psychological condition for the individual to engage as an individual in
the discourse that leads to moral reciprocity and mutual respect (2001: 73).
Therefore, if the claims of freedom emerging from the personal domain are
absent, there can hardly be a moral conception of rights: ‘Thus, morality and
personal freedom are interdependent rather than oppositional features of
human development’ (2001: 74).According to this psychological theory, which
Spiecker, De Ruyter and Steutel:Taking the right to exit seriously
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is corroborated by empirical research, the child needs elbow or discretionary
room in order to develop morally and to grasp the meaning of rights, includ-
ing the concept of the right to exit. And are not especially children (and
women) denied discretionary room in fundamentalist or ultra-orthodox
religious communities? Children do have the psychological urge to create
their own personal domain and despite the parental efforts to hamper this
development many may indeed succeed in doing so, but again not all of them
will be successful in that respect. For children to grasp the meaning of the
right to exit in due time, they should be able to develop in the personal
domain and this in turn excludes an upbringing and education which does
shield them away from the world outside their own community.
The right to exit implies that a person has the capacity to make a personal
decision and this in turn presupposes at least a level of minimal autonomy or
personal independency. In our view, the latter disposition does not necessarily
imply that one has fully grasped the meaning of the ideal of autonomy or that
one personally subscribes to this ideal. The ideal of autonomy means that a
person has critically reflected about the principles and values that she adheres
to and that she is able to change her beliefs on the basis of her own critical
evaluation of her current views and alternatives. Furthermore, she acts in
accordance with these principles and does not give in to pressures of others.
We use the concept ‘ideal’ deliberately. ‘Ideals’ refer to situations or traits of
character that are conceived to be excellent and because of this are highly
valued, but also difficult if not impossible to achieve (De Ruyter, 2003;
Thiessen, 1993). In this sense, autonomy is an ideal par excellence. Not only
is it excellent, it is impossible to be autonomous constantly; it is not a dispo-
sition or a characteristic that continuously permeates all segments of a person’s
life all the time. Next to the burdens of reasons (Rawls, 1993), sometimes due
to pressing emotions and motivations, a person deliberately acts contrary to
what her reasons, which are based on her critical thinking abilities, dictate.
Nevertheless, in our view, this person is maximally autonomous if she
subscribes to the ideal and has the capacities to think and act accordingly most
of the time. Interestingly, although orthodox parents oppose to such a ‘psycho-
logically realistic’ conception of maximal autonomy, it is not necessarily at
odds with their intention to initiate their offspring into their conception of
the good life with the aim of having them personally subscribe to their religious
beliefs (De Ruyter, 2001). All too often the ideal of autonomy is seen as a
spectre, which leads to a vanishing of all cultural and religious diversity. Diver-
sity, however, should not be confused with group conformity; the former in
our view is well served by the ideal of autonomy.
As is well known, with reference to Kohlberg’s three levels of moral reason-
ing, Rawls distinguishes three forms of morality: morality of authority,
Theory and Research in Education 4 (3 )
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morality of association, and morality of principle (Rawls, 1972: 474).The latter
distinction can indeed be a fruitful theoretical devise too, but it should be kept
in mind that Kohlberg’s levels, unlike the forms of morality, represent a logical
(irreversible and universal) sequence of (individual) development. Although
according to Kohlberg’s theory it is inconceivable for a person to function
constantly at two different moral levels or different stages, it seems quite
possible for a person to function in two different forms of morality.True, the
institutions of a liberal democracy should and indeed are organized according
to the principles (of justice) of the morality of principle, but at the same time
the liberal state allows members of all kinds of voluntary associations to
function and to arrange their lives strictly according to a morality of associ-
ation. And a person can very well be a respected member of an orthodox-
religious association and a good citizen at the same time; however, this person,
because she has acquired the central liberal virtues, has a different perspective
on the morality of association she underwrites than the non- or illiberal
person. Her orientation towards and acceptance of for example the authority
and strict rules of her community is closely associated with her understand-
ing that a liberal democracy necessarily implies a pluralism of conceptions of
the good. She will accept this authority and these rules only to the extent that
these do not conflict with the principles of justice or fairness. For instance,
orthodox believers do not perceive the different positions of men and women
in their religious community as unjust, because both sexes are ordained with
different roles but treated with the same respect. Her understanding and
appreciation of the ideal of autonomy enables her to choose willingly for an
autarchic way of life. Such a person functions at both stages 4 and 5; from stage
5 she adapts to the rules and reasoning within her community that are charac-
teristic for stage 4. This implies, in our view, that the stages are not as irre-
versible as Kohlberg and Piaget want us to believe. Moreover, this person is
both orthodox and autonomous, which leads to the more general conclusion
that in principle orthodoxy and autonomy are not necessarily incompatible.
Nancy Rosenblum also argues that there is a psychological continuity
between the origin and expression of moral dispositions in associations and
the inclinations of public justice, that is, between our moral orientation qua
community members and qua citizens (Rosenblum, 1998: 52). Looking back
from the stage of morality of principle, and here Rosenblum quotes Rawls,
‘persons understand their sense of justice as an extension of their natural
attachments, as a way of caring about the collective good’ (1998: 52). The
question then arises of what might facilitate or promote this cognitive-
affective restructuring of a morality of association or, phrased differently, how
can a different perspective on one’s morality of association be developed?
Seeing or understanding a set of moral rules and practices of an association in
Spiecker, De Ruyter and Steutel:Taking the right to exit seriously
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perspective necessarily implies that one has to cross or transcend the borders
of that moral association.Therefore, as we argue later, in compulsory school-
ing or school education, children should not be confined in one, from their
perspective involuntary, insular association, but as they develop be given
opportunities to explore and venture into different (kinds of) associations and
thus become acquainted with a diversity of rules and roles. From the stand-
point of development, according to Rosenblum, a plurality of associations
presenting an array of ideals and demands is crucial (1998: 51).
two  d i le m mas  f or  th e  l i b e ral  state
Earlier we agreed with Snik’s (1999: 144) conclusion that the right to exit
not only conflicts with the central beliefs of illiberal communities, but that
this right also requires educational practices which are at odds with illiberal
ones. If parents educate their children towards ethical servility in order to
ensure that their children will adopt their parents’ faith, the liberal state is
confronted with a dilemma: should either the right to exit of the child (as
future citizen) or the right of parents to initiate their children into their
religious beliefs and practices be toned down or limited? Is the child and its
upbringing and schooling primarily an extension of the ideals of the parents
or of those of the liberal state? An acceptable way out of this dilemma is that
parental upbringing should minimally aim for autarchy, that is, for the child
to become a self-governing and accountable adult, who at least is minimally
autonomous. If this is accepted as a minimum standard, this means by impli-
cation that systematically trying to inculcate the child into ethical servility 
is to be understood as child neglect, i.e. a form of child abuse. Therefore,
the state must, as Vojak and Feinberg (2004) also claim, retain the more
proactive function of ensuring certain rights of the child apart from the
parents’ desires. This position would allow us to make two kinds of claim.
First, one could argue that child neglect justifies the liberal state’s inter-
vention in the family. This may be defensible in principle, but should be
rejected on practical utilitarian grounds for it will damage the well-being of
both children and parents (and in the end the state) instead of serving it. First,
it would it lead to a policing state, because children themselves are not able
to report the neglect as they can – in principle – in the case of physical 
abuse, for it demands precisely the capacities that they do not have. Second,
it is questionable if intervention would be more beneficial to the child than
non-intervention. Thus, we want to defend a second, milder, position.
The liberal state can only try to compensate this form of child neglect by 
making civic education compulsory.
The right to exit is a right of citizens in a liberal democracy, and therefore
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educating children towards autarchy in order to be able to make use of their
right can be conceived as being part of civic education.This means that, if we
take the right to exit seriously, civic education should be compulsory for all
students.What can be the content of civic education that the liberal demo-
cratic state may enforce upon all pupils? Now the state seems to face another
dilemma: on the one hand it would want to go beyond the minimal level of
autarchy in preparing students to become citizens of a liberal democracy who
have capacities and dispositions which might resemble those characteristic for
autonomy (position a) but, on the other hand, education that aims for autarchy
is more fully in line with the liberal character of the state because it does not
impose a conception of the good life on the students (position b).
This dilemma enables us to gain a better insight into the positions of
Galston and Spinner-Halev. In arguing for the importance of the knowledge,
capacities and psychological conditions for the right to exit as described
earlier, Galston seems to defend an education that aims for more than minimal
autonomy or autarchy (close to position a). In our view this could only be
applicable to schooling or school education, because the requirements he proposes
go beyond the aims defensible for parental upbringing. If we would extrapo-
late all conditions of schooling to upbringing, the parental right to raise their
child towards autarchy regarding their conception of the good might be
denied. Spinner-Halev’s arguments, on the other hand, seem to refer primarily
to parental upbringing and are, in our view, not valid for schooling or school
education in liberal democracies, because he does not seem to underwrite the
aim of autarchy (position b). Moreover, we believe that Spinner-Halev does
not distance himself sufficiently from an upbringing that is intended to stall
the child’s development at the level of ethical servility, thereby violating the
child’s right to a normal development.
If we take the right to exit seriously, civic education not only involves
teaching students that they have rights; it also comprises teaching them how
to exercise the basic rights, including the right to exit. Next to having knowl-
edge of alternatives to the life one lives, students must know how to assess
these alternatives. This also implies that students should be guarded against
forms of brainwashing and coercion that form part of mind-programming
efforts of ultra-orthodox teachers.The state, in our view, has a duty to ascer-
tain that children at least acquire the minimally necessary dispositions, namely
autarchy, to exercise the freedom rights later in life, and that no student leaves
school with the dispositions characteristic for ethical servility (position b).
Does the position we have defended imply that diversity is endangered? The
answer is ‘yes’, if diversity were to include groups who systematically ignore
the right to exit. If we conceptualize diversity as legitimate diversity, which is
essentially connected to the right to exit, the answer must be ‘no’.Therefore,
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Galston and Spinner-Halev can be more unequivocal with regard to the right
to exit and diversity than they are.
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